RMAI Update September 2021

Both the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate have been on summer break for most of August and the first two weeks of September. The House and Senate will resume business this week. In the congressional timeline, there is very limited floor time to consider proposals. Much of Congress’s attention will be focused on the major issues including infrastructure legislation and passing the massive federal budget. We do expect CFPB Director nominee, Rohit Chopra, to be confirmed by the Senate sometime in September. Following his confirmation, RMAI will immediately seek to schedule a meeting with him and his team to introduce RMAI’s Receivables Management Certification Program and provide education on the key role the industry plays in the credit ecosystem. We are closely monitoring the Biden administration’s action regarding COVID orders. So far, we have no indication that any of the emergency orders restricting the collection of debt will be extended nor will new ones be implemented.

As expected, the CFPB formerly withdrew their proposed rule which would have delayed the implementation date of the two debt collection rules. Compliance with the two debt collection rules will be required by November 30, 2021.

And as we go to press, we still have no indication out of the 11^th Circuit of whether they will grant an en banc rehearing of the Hunstein case. RMAI continues to hold monthly meetings for members and their defense counsels, who are facing copycat litigation. If you are facing such litigation, please contact Jan Stieger (jstieger@rmaintl.org) to be included in these monthly meetings.

RMAI monitors, tracks, and responds to legislative and regulatory activity in all 50 states as the need arises.  Backed by RMAI’s State Legislative Committee and a team of state lobbyists, RMAI educates legislators about the industry and the negative impacts or unintended consequences a bill would have on businesses and consumers. In 2021, RMAI continued with its impressive track record of success. The following are some recent developments at the state legislative level that might be of interest:

California AB 1020 – This bill will accomplish two primary objectives: (1) to ensure hospitals make every effort to identify and accept third-party payments from insurance, charity, or government sources prior to attempts to collect unpaid debts and (2) to ensure collection agencies and debt buyers obtain substantive data and documentation from hospitals related to the debt prior to collection; they inform consumers of their rights; and provide consumers with documentation of the debt upon request. [This bill has passed both houses and is awaiting the Governor’s signature. RMAI successfully obtained amendments that removed a ban on the sale of hospital debt to debt buyers that existed in earlier versions of the bill.]

California SB 531 – This bill will extend the data and documentation requirements that were adopted in the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act in 2013 to the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bill will require collection agencies to obtain certain data and documents prior to collection and provide the same to consumers upon request. [This bill has passed both houses and is awaiting the Governor’s signature. RMAI successfully obtained amendments addressing several concerns which resulted in an exemption for debt buyers. RMAI did not want debt buyers subject to two strict liability statutes related to the same topic.]

District of Columbia B 348 [Chapter A24-0169 of the Laws of 2021] – The law will take effect on September 23, 2021. The law will be in effect for 225 days to provide the D.C. City Council the opportunity to adopt permanent legislation. The law (and the anticipated permanent legislation) adopts a significant overhaul to D.C.’s debt collection laws related to collection activity and litigation. Among other things, the law: (1) expands the prohibitions on deceptive behavior; (2) prohibits debt collectors from making more than three phone calls to a consumer in seven days; (3) requires debt collectors to have complete documentation related to the consumer debt being collected; (4) requires debt collectors to provide extensive data and documents to the consumer within 15 days of a written request; (5) requires lengthy consumer notices informing consumers of their rights; (6) requires debt collectors who enter into a payment schedule or settlement to provide a written copy of the schedule or agreement; (7) adds specific requirements for a debt collector when initiating a cause of action against a consumer for consumer debt; and (8) increases damages that can be awarded to a consumer for violation of the act. [RMAI retained a D.C. lobbyist to advocate on behalf of the industry. RMAI and an industry coalition were successful in: (a) adding exemptions to the call cap limitation, (b) eliminating pre-charge-off itemization of credit card debt; (c) eliminating the requirement for 24 months of statements; (d) eliminating unsolicited mailing requirements foisted upon debt collectors involving sensitive consumer data; (e) eliminating a requirement that the “original account number” be in the bill of sale; (f) eliminating mandatory punitive damages; and (g) eliminating a “per violation” penalty. More work needs to be done on the “permanent” bill which will be adopted sometime this Fall.]

New York SB 153 – This bill which is known as the “Consumer Credit Fairness Act” would: (1) reduce the statute of limitations from six to three years on consumer credit transactions; (2) prohibit the revival of a debt that is beyond the statute of limitations through the making of a payment; (3) require the mailing of a notice by the court clerk after filing proof of service of the summons and complaint; (4) require specific data to be included in the complaint; and (5) require the provision of form affidavits. [This bill has passed both houses of the State Legislature and the Governor is expected to sign the bill into law. RMAI had been actively opposing this bill since it was first introduced in 2009. After years of industry offers to negotiate the bill being rejected, the sponsors finally expressed a desire to discuss our concerns. After 13 months of negotiations, the industry was successful at: (1) removing language which would have expunged all debt at the expiration of the statute of limitations; (2) removing pre-charge-off itemization requirements on revolving lines of credit; (3) changing the point of reference on data and documents from origination to charge-off; (4) clarifying a provision of existing law, that some judges were misinterpreting, to make clear that creditors are not required to inform consumers when their accounts are sold in order for the successor parties in interest to be able to collect on those accounts; and (5) extending the effective date by six months to provide the industry time to adjust operational controls as well as accelerate any legal actions under existing law.]

New York SB 5724-A – This bill would set post-judgment interest at 2% per annum and would apply this interest rate retroactively to judgments entered prior to its effective date. [This bill has passed both houses and is awaiting the Governor’s signature. RMAI and a broad-based coalition is seeking chapter amendments to this bill that would remove the retroactive nature of the law. Realistically, obtaining a veto is unlikely given the politics of New York State.]

7th Cir. Holds Anxiety and Embarrassment Not Enough for Standing

Wadsworth v. Kross, Lieberman & Stone, Inc., No. 19-1400, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 26231 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 2021)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed and remanded a trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff, holding that the alleged FDCPA violations did not cause any concrete harm and were simply procedural violations that Article III precludes federal courts from adjudicating.

A company hired the plaintiff and, in its offer letter, described a signing bonus: $3,750 payable after 30 days of employment, followed by another $3,750 after 180 days of employment. If the plaintiff voluntarily ended her employment or the company fired her for cause within 18 months, she was obligated to repay the full bonus.

The plaintiff collected both signing payments, but after she completed one year of employment, the company fired her. A debt collection agency, the defendant, attempted to recover the bonus payments. The debt collector mailed the plaintiff a collection letter and an agency employee called the plaintiff by telephone four times.

The plaintiff sued the debt collector, claiming that its letter and phone calls violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., by failing to provide complete written notice of her statutory rights within five days of the initial communication and because the caller never identified herself as a debt collector.

The trial court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff and the debt collector timely appealed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the requirement of standing. To establish standing to sue in federal court, “[t]the plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff would have suffered a concrete injury only if the debt collector’s failure to provide notice of the plaintiff’s statutory rights caused her to suffer a harm identified by the FDCPA, “such as paying money she did not owe” or would have disputed.

In her complaint and testimony, the plaintiff alleged only that she suffered emotional harm, specifically personal humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Furthermore, the plaintiff testified at her deposition that she never paid the debt collector or the company any money after the debt collector contacted her, nor did she rely on the debt collector’s communication to her detriment in any other way. Instead, she stated that she got less sleep and felt intimidated, worried, and embarrassed.

The Seventh Circuit concluded that anxiety and embarrassment are not injuries in fact for the purposes of FDCPA standing. Indeed, the Court pointed out that it already expressly rejected “stress” as constituting a concrete injury following an FDCPA violation and had found that it is not enough for a plaintiff to be “annoyed” or “intimidated” by a violation.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

6th Cir. Holds No Article III Standing for Mere Confusion

Ward v. Nat’l Patient Account Servs. Sols., No. 20-5902, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 24369 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021)

A healthcare provider hired a debt servicer (“defendant”) to collect an outstanding balance  from a consumer. The defendant allegedly left several voice messages while attempting to collect the debt.

The consumer filed suit alleging the defendant violated the FDCPA because it did not accurately identify itself in its voicemails, and that this caused confusion resulting the consumer sending a cease and desist letter to the wrong entity.

Specifically, the consumer claimed that the defendant violated § 1692d(6) of the FDCPA, which provides that a “debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt[,]” including the “placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.”

The consumer also claimed that the defendant violated § 1692e(14), which provides that a “debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt[,]” including “us[ing] any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector’s business, company, or organization.”

The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that it did not meet the definition of a debt collector under the FDCPA, and the trial court granted the motion. The consumer appealed.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the consumer lacked Article III standing. Although the defendant did not raise this issue with the trial court, the Sixth Circuit observed that it has an independent obligation to determine its jurisdiction to hear an appeal.

The issue was whether the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact and, specifically, whether it was “concrete.” The consumer claimed that he suffered a concrete injury for two reasons. First, he argued that the violation of his procedural rights under the FDCPA established a concrete injury. Second, he claimed that the confusion caused by the phone calls and expense of the counsel that he retained demonstrated that he suffered a concrete injury.

The consumer argued that the FDCPA created an enforceable right to know who is calling about a debt because the defendant’s failure to correctly provide its full legal name concretely harmed him. The consumer further argued that this harm is closely related to the invasion of privacy harm that most states recognize.

Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, The Sixth Circuit rejected the consumer’s argument because the defendant’s alleged failure to disclose its full legal name did not resemble a traditional harm “regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit,” as required to establish a concrete injury.

The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that most states recognize actions to enforce the right of privacy, including “the tort of intrusion upon one’s right to seclusion.” However, the Court noted that not receiving full and complete information about the name of a defendant does not closely resemble the tort of intrusion upon seclusion because this common law tort typically requires proof that the defendant “intentionally intrude[d], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his privacy affairs or concerns.”

The consumer’s alleged harm did not impact his privacy.  Instead, it merely confused him. The defendant did not share his private information with a third party or publicize his private information. Thus, the Sixth Circuit found that the consumer’s claimed harm did “not bear a close relationship to traditional harms” and the consumer could not establish standing based solely upon the alleged statutory violations. The Court vacated the trial court’s order granting summary judgment and remanded the case to be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

7th Cir. Finds Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleged Agency Relationship in TCPA Suit

Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 20-2504, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 23655 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint alleging supposed violations of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and the Illinois Automatic Telephone Dialing Act (IATDA), concluding that the plaintiff alleged enough of an agency relationship between the defendants and the entities that placed the subject calls for the complaint to move forward.

The plaintiff received unauthorized robocalls concerning health insurance that allegedly violated the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and IATDA, 815 ILCS 305/30(a)(b). The plaintiff sued on a vicarious liability theory, claiming that an insurer contracted with a marketer to sell its insurance. The marketer then hired lead generators to effectuate telemarketing, and the lead generators made the unauthorized robocalls that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff cited three agency theories: actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.

The insurer and the marketer each moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. The insurer brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege an agency relationship between itself and the lead generators. Making the same agency arguments, the marketer moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). It argued that without alleging a plausible agency relationship, the plaintiff failed to connect the marketer to Illinois through the lead generators’ conduct.

The trial court agreed with the defendants, ruling that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the lead generators acted pursuant to a valid agency theory.

On the actual authority claim, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege agency because his complaint lacked allegations of the defendants’ control over the timing, quantity, and geographic location of the lead generators’ unauthorized robocalls. It next found the apparent authority claims insufficient because the plaintiff alleged only that the purported agents — not the principals — made manifestations to the plaintiff. Finally, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to allege agency under the ratification theory because the plaintiff did not allege that he purchased health insurance from the robocalls, so the defendants accepted no benefits from the calls.

In light of its determinations on the plaintiff’s three agency theories, the trial court held that the plaintiff neither stated a claim against the insurer nor established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the marketer.

Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint and entered final judgment in the defendants’ favor and the plaintiff timely appealed.

The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the trial court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the insurer.

The Court noted that actual authority requires that, at the time of an agent’s conduct, “the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.” Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that to prove that the lead generators in this case had actual authority to act as the agents of the insurer, the plaintiff needed to show evidence that (1) a principal/agent relationship existed, (2) the principal controlled or had the right to control the alleged agent’s conduct, and (3) the alleged conduct fell within the scope of the agency.

The Seventh Circuit determined that it need not decide whether the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient, if true, to prove his vicarious liability claims. Instead, the Court determined it only needed to ascertain whether the plaintiff’s allegations included enough detail to render his actual authority theory of agency liability plausible.

The plaintiff alleged that the lead generators acted as the insurer’s agents, with actual authority, when they initiated robocalls to the plaintiff’s cellphone without his consent. The plaintiff also claimed that the insurer authorized the lead generators to use its approved scripts, tradename, and proprietary information in making the calls.

The Seventh Circuit held that these allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, supported the inference that the insurer authorized the lead generators to act on its behalf and subject to its control.

The insurer argued that the plaintiff failed to state a plausible agency claim to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because his complaint lacked allegations that the insurer controlled the timing, quantity, and geographic location of the lead generators’ robocalls. However, the Seventh Circuit held that allegations of minute details of the parties’ business relationship are not required to allege a plausible agency claim.

With a plausible agency claim on the actual authority theory, the Seventh Circuit held that the complaint should move forward at the pleading stage. In reaching this result, the Court also decided that it need not rule on the plaintiff’s apparent authority and ratification theories of agency liability.

The Seventh Circuit next addressed the trial court’s dismissal of the marketer for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a non-resident through the conduct of an agent. See 735 ILCS 5/2- 209(a). In addition, § 2-209(c) provides a catch-all provision, permitting a court’s exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Illinois and United States Constitutions. See 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c).

Moreover, to comport with federal due process, a defendant must maintain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that “the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” When considering due process for specific personal jurisdiction, the court must determine whether “(1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant’s forum-related activities.”

The Seventh Circuit concluded that attribution of an agent’s conduct to a principal to establish specific personal jurisdiction comports with federal due process. In doing so, the Court joined other circuits that have recognized the same, specifically, Nandjou v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 985 F.3d 135, 150 (1st Cir. 2021), Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2001).

Here, the lead generators’ alleged illegal phone calls formed the basis of the plaintiff’s TCPA and IATDA claims. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff adequately alleged that the lead generators acted with the marketer’s actual authority, as the Court had ruled regarding the insurer. The plaintiff alleged not only that the marketer contracted with the lead generators directly to telemarket the insurer’s health insurance, but that the marketer participated in the calls in real-time by pairing the agents with the insurer’s health insurance quotes, emailing quotes to call recipients, and permitting the agents to enter information into its system.

These well-pleaded factual allegations were enough, in the Seventh Circuit’s view, to support an agency relationship on actual authority grounds at the pleading stage. As a result, the Court concluded that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over the marketer.

Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

9th Cir. Holds TCPA Prohibitions Extend Beyond Marketing or Advertising Calls

Loyhayem v. Fraser Fin. & Ins. Servs., No. 20-56014, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 23660 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2021)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently reversed the dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint alleging violations of the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) for placing a job recruitment “robocall” to the plaintiff’s cell phone. In so ruling, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff pleaded allegations adequate to survive a motion to dismiss because the TCPA’s prohibition on robocalls to cell phone numbers applies to “any call,” not just marketing or advertising calls.

The plaintiff allegedly received an unauthorized call to his cell phone in which the caller left a “job recruitment” voicemail.  The plaintiff alleged the call was placed using an automated telephone dialing system (ATDS) and an artificial or pre-recorded voice.

The plaintiff filed suit against the company identified in the voicemail, claiming that the call violated the TCPA’s prohibitions against calls using “any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to “any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service.” § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

The defendant moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted its motion, concluding that the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and its relevant implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, did not prohibit calls of this nature, but only robocalls to cell phones when the calls include an “advertisement” or constitute “telemarketing,” which the plaintiff recipient conceded were not included in the voicemail.  § 64.1200(f)(1), (13).  The plaintiff timely appealed the dismissal.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first reviewed the plain language of the TCPA, noting that the Act does not apply only to calls involving advertising or telemarketing, but plainly prohibits “any call,” regardless of content, that is made to a cell phone using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or pre-recorded voice, unless the call is made either for emergency purposes or with the prior express consent of the person being called. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

The Court found that the plaintiff adequately alleged that the call he received was not made for emergency purposes, and that he did not expressly consent to receiving it.  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that he stated a valid claim for violation of the TCPA pursuant to the plain language of the statute.

The Court also found support in the FCC’s relevant implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. The relevant implementing language, which closely tracks the language of the statute, includes a qualifier that prohibits “any telephone call” made to a cell phone unless the call was made either for emergency purposes or with the prior express consent of the person being called “except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section.”

The Ninth Circuit noted that the FCC’s amendment of § 64.1200 in 2012 to add paragraph (a)(2) served to impose a heightened consent requirement only for the subset of robocalls that involve advertising or telemarketing because the agency determined that the existing consent requirements proved ineffective in protecting consumers’ privacy interests. However, the FCC expressly maintained the existing consent requirement in paragraph (a)(1) for all other robocalls made to cell phones.

Thus, the Court held the undisputed fact that the call did not involve advertising or marketing simply meant that the heightened written consent requirement imposed by paragraph (a)(2) did not apply, and the trial court erred by focusing exclusively on paragraph (a)(2) of the FCC’s implementing regulation and overlooking paragraph (a)(1), which governed the allegedly violative call.

Because the recipient plaintiff adequately alleged that he did not consent to the defendant’s job recruiting call orally or in writing, the Ninth Circuit ruled that his complaint pleaded allegations sufficient to state a claim under the TCPA.  The trial court’s dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Where Do Legislative Fund Dollars Go?

Every dollar contributed to the Legislative Fund goes to state and federal advocacy. 2021 has been another wild year for the receivables management industry at the state and federal levels. Thanks to our members, RMAI has been able to secure lobbyists to help fight unfavorable legislation in several states. RMAI recently updated the Legislative Fund infographic which shows where donations have gone this year. Additionally, you can see which states are the most active as well as other RMAI state and federal advocacy efforts.

Our Legislative Fundraising Committee is working hard to bring in more donations so RMAI can continue to advocate on your behalf. With membership renewals coming up in October, please consider donating to RMAI’s Legislative Fund when you pay your renewal dues.

View the Infographic | Donate to the Legislative Fund

About the Legislative Fund

RMAI actively monitors and responds to state and federal measures affecting how our members do business. Your contributions to the Legislative Fund extend the reach of RMAI’s advocacy across the country where and when needed. Read more about the Legislative Fund here.

WATCH WEBINARS

Register for RMAI’s next monthly webinar on September 29^th, A Word from our Regulators – A look at where we have been and a view toward where we are going, with speakers from the Colorado & Wyoming Attorney General’s Office and Minnesota Department of Commerce. View our Live Webinar page on the RMAI website for future webinars.

View our Online Education selection and register for previously recorded webinars including the most recent webinar hosted on September 3rd, Amended DC Emergency Legislation. All recorded monthly webinars are FREE to RMAI members. (Special series and select required courses for certification are offered at a discounted member rate.)

SPONSOR WEBINARS

Get your business name and logo in front of a captive audience of your colleagues and RMAI members when you sponsor a webinar! View our Webinar Sponsorship Flyer for details and benefits of a sponsorship. Contact Shannon Parod at sparod@rmaintl.org or 916.482.2590 with any questions.

Congratulations to our new and renewed Certified Receivables Compliance Professionals (CRCP) and new and renewed Certified Receivable Businesses (CRB)!

CRCP – New
Penny Cunha – RMAI
Todd Hinrichs  – Phin Solutions
Vyacheslav (Slava) Lysenko – Debex, Inc.
Leah Snyder – Branding Arc
Susan Unterberger – Jefferson Capital Systems
Dennis DiGesare – Huntington Debt Holdings
Mellisa Massey – National Credit Adjusters
Amy Dowdey – Denali Capital

CRCP – Renewals
Mike Colby – Second Round
Addison Crawford – Encore Capital Group
Louis Lopez – Dalty Acquisitions
Andrea Rose – United Holding Group
Eric Rosenkoetter – Maurice Wutscher
Aristotle Sangalang – The Bureaus, Inc.
David Taylor – Portfolio Recovery Associates
James Vaughan – Law Office of James R. Vaughan
Rich Weissman – O & L Law Group
Trudy Weiss-Craig – Unifund
Lily Wood – Rausch, Sturm LLP

CRB – New
Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC (Family of Companies)

CRB – Renewals
Acctcorp International

IS YOUR INDIVIDUAL OR BUSINESS CERTIFICATION RENEWAL COMING UP?

If you have received a notification that your individual or business certification is coming up for renewal this year, be sure you complete and submit all of the required information needed for renewal.

Individual Certification Renewal (CRCP)

Individual certification renewals require 24 education credits taken since your certification was approved or last renewed. This includes the newly added “required” course on Diversity, Inclusion & Elimination of Bias. Diversity & Inclusion: Bridging the Generational Gap is a recorded webinar available on the Online Education webpage on the RMAI website.

Complete your renewal application here.

Business Certification Renewal (CRB or CRV)

Please ensure your company is in compliance with all appropriate standards prior to submitting your renewal application, including any family of companies you may have. Upon submitting your renewal application, please include proof of E&O Insurance (Standard A2 for CRB and 104 for CRV).

Make any necessary updates to your website in regard to the Website & Publication standard (A14 for CRB and 106 for CRV)

Complete your CRB renewal application here. | Complete your CRV renewal application here.

View all certified businesses and vendors.
View all certified individuals.
View educational requirements for certified individuals.

For questions about certification, contact RMAI at 916-482-2462 or email CERT@ramintl.org.

RMAI’s leadership cultivates relationships within the receivables management industry to expand business opportunities for members.

RMAI 2021 Atlanta Regional Event | September 27-28, 2021

NACARA 28th Annual Meeting | October 4-6, 2021

Used Car Week | November 15-18, 2021

RMAI 2022 Annual Conference | February 7-10, 2022

Join RMAI at Used Car Week 2021 in Las Vegas, NV. RMAI members receive a $250 discount by entering the code RMAI2021. Combining five different conferences, Used Car Week unites all corners of the used-car industry from remarketing to dealer-consignor relations and auto finance for four days to discuss current trends, forecasting for the future and prepping for the road ahead. Our Executive Director Jan Stieger will be participating in an association panel discussion. Register here and don’t forget to enter code RMAI2021!

Thank you to our August 2020 – August 10, 2021 Legislative Fund Contributors!

Diamond $25,000

Cavalry Investments, LLC

Crown Asset Management, LLC

Financial Recovery Services, Inc.

Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC

Resurgent Holdings, LLC

Titanium $15,000

Velocity Portfolio Group, Inc.

Platinum $10,000

C&E Acquisition Group, LLC/Diverse Funding Associates, LLC/DNF Associates

CKS Financial

Crown Asset Management, LLC

Encore Capital Group, Inc.

Unifund CCR LLC

Gold $7,500

DebtTrader

First Financial Portfolio Service, LLC

Silver $5,000

Collins Asset Group LLC

NCB Management Services, Inc.

Oliphant United, LLC

Pharus Funding, LLC

Superlative RM

U.S. Equities Corp.

Bronze $2,500

Absolute Resolutions Corp.

Central Portfolio Control, Inc.

Investment Retrievers, Inc.

National Loan Exchange, Inc.

RAzOR Capital, LLC

SAM, Inc. – Solutions for Account Management

Security Credit Services, LLC

Spire Recovery Solutions, LLC

Synergetic Communication, inc.

Brass $1,000

Andreu, Palma, Lavin & Solis, PLLC

Balbec Capital, LP

Bayview Solutions, LLC

Equifax, Inc.

Halsted Financial Services, LLC

Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC

Jormandy, LLC

Kino Financial Co., LLC

Pressler, Felt and Warshaw, LLP

Resurgence Capital, LLC

Stenger & Stenger P.C.

Stephen L. Bruce & Associates

The Cadle Company

The Law Offices of Ronald S. Canter, LLC

TrueAccord

United Holding Group

Vertican Technologies, Inc

Other

Accelerated Data Systems

Acctorp International, Inc.

Action Collection Agencies, Inc.

Aldridge Pite Haan, LLP

Alliance Credit Services, Inc.

Alpha Recovery Corp.

Applied Innovation, Inc.

Arko Consulting LLC

Attunely Inc.

Ballard Spahr, LLP

Bloom & Associates, P.A.

Butler & Associates, P.A.

Capio

Capital Collection Management, LLC

Cascade Capital, LLC

Central Research, Inc.

CMS Services

Collins Asset Group

Commercial Credit Group Inc.

Complete Credit Solutions

Comtronic Systems, LLC

Convergence Acquisitions, LLC

Converging Capital, LLC

Convoke, Inc.

Credit Control, LLC

Credit Management Corporation

CSS Impact!

D & A Services, LLC

D. Scott Carruthers, APLC

David Reid

DebtTrader

Delev & Associates, LLC

Delta Outsource Group, Inc.

Dynamic Recovery Solutions

Faloni Law Group, LLC

FLOCK Specialty Finance

FMS, Inc.

FocusOne, Inc.

Full Circle Financial Services, LLC

G. Reynolds Sims & Associates, P.C.

Gaskell & Giovannini, LLC

Genesis Recovery Services

Glass Mountain Capital, LLC

Hunt & Henriques

Indiana Receivables, Inc.

International Debt Buying Consultants, LLC

Invenio Financial, a Phillips & Cohen Associates Company

Jan Stieger

Keith D. Weiner & Associates Co., LPA

Kelly Knepper- Stephens

Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C.

Law Office of James R. Vaughan, P.C.

Law Offices of Daniel C. Consuegra, P.L.

Law Offices of Steven Cohen, LLC

Lippman Recupero

Lockhart, Morris & Montgomery, Inc.

Logicoll, LLC

London & London

LTD Financial Services

Malone Frost Martin PLLC

Maurice Wutscher LLP

Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC

Metronome Financial LLC

Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.

MRS BPO, LLC

Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn, LP

National Check Resolution, Inc.

National Enterprise Systems, Inc.

National Recovery Associates

National Recovery Solutions

NDS, LLC

Nelson & Kennard

Neustar, Inc.

NRA Group, LLC

Ontario Systems, LLC

Orion Capital Solutions, LLC

Palinode, LLC

PCI Group, Inc.

PerSolve, LLC

Phin Solutions, Inc.

Portnoy Schneck, L.L.C.

Poser Investments, Inc.

Premier Forty Financial, LLC

ProVest

Quantum3 Group, LLC

Resource Management Services, Inc

RevSpring

RIP Medical Debt

Robinson Hoover & Fudge, PLLC

SCORE Statistical Consulting

Simmonds & Narita LLP

Slovin & Associates

Solutions by Text

Sonnek & Goldblatt, Ltd.

Stone, Higgs & Drexler

Superlative RM

Tobin & Marohn

Troy Capital, LLC

Universal Fidelity LP

US Mortgage Resolution, LLC

USI Solutions, Inc.

VanDerHeyden Law Office PA

Vargo & Janson, P.C.

Venable LLP

Venandi Systems, LLCVerifacts, Inc.

Viking Client Services, Inc.

VoApps

Wipfli LLP