In This Update

CONTENTS

Executive Summit 2021          Federal Activity          State Legislative
Court Decisions      Legislative Fund          Education          Certification
Membership     Industry Events

Please click the banner headers below for more information on your chosen topic.

Register for the Executive Summit! Add Golf for Monday while spots are still available. In-person networking, education and more are all in store for you at Stowe. Top off Tuesday and Wednesday with after-hours at the fire pit. Reconnect with friends, family and colleagues and catch up on industry developments and guidance.

Reserve your room at The Lodge at Spruce Peak. The RMAI room block closes July 9. Review the online Agenda to plan your super Summit experience.

Register for Golf, Advocacy and/or Baseball! Whether you hit a single, a double or a triple, this three-component networking event is a home run for receivables management professionals. Tee off for golf on Monday, and join us for an opening reception in the evening. Then on Tuesday, get an in-depth look at RMAI’s advocacy program and a grassroots tool kit, and top it all off by enjoying an Atlanta Braves baseball game from The Back Porch. 

Registration opened TODAY! Space is limited so REGISTER NOW for one, two or all three components of this event. Check out the discounted package rate for both the advocacy program and the baseball game.

After 15 months, RMAI leadership made its first trip to Washington, D.C. to advocate on behalf of our members. Our federal counsel team at K&L Gates secured several in person and virtual meetings with both Republicans and Democrats. Focusing on the Senate, productive meetings were held with Senate Banking staff and key subcommittee staff. While reestablishing RMAI as a trusted resource on industry issues, RMAI was able to convey the positive impact RMAI’s Receivables Management Certification Program has played in setting gold standards and establishing best industry practices. Without exception, Certification is well received and provided the “proof” that we are serious about professional and ethical collection of legitimate date. There is still much work to do in D.C., but RMAI is committed to continue to work for fair and balanced legislation.

RMAI continues to await the confirmation of Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Director nominee Rohit Chopra. It is possible confirmation will occur prior to the August break.

Additionally, RMAI continues to watch for a formal announcement from the CFPB that the implementation date for the debt collection rule is extended to January 29, 2022. All involved believe that the purpose of this extension is to give the CFPB more time to determine which parts of the debt collection rule are going to be pulled back for rewriting.

RMAI monitors, tracks, and responds to legislative and regulatory activity in all 50 states as the need arises.  Backed by RMAI’s State Legislative Committee and a team of state lobbyists, RMAI educates legislators about the industry and the negative impacts or unintended consequences a bill would have on businesses and consumers. In 2021, RMAI continued with its impressive track record of success. The following are some recent developments at the state legislative level that might be of interest:

California AB 1020 – This bill would among other things prohibit the sale of hospital debt to debt buyers. [RMAI has been working collaboratively with the bill’s author on amendments that would remove the ban on sales to debt buyers and is cautiously optimistic it will be amended in the next week. RMAI strongly opposes the provision of any bill which prohibits the sale of an entire asset class of debt. We view this as a dangerous precedent which could be used in the future to prohibit the sale of other asset classes.]

California SB 531 – This bill would require collection agencies to provide certain data and documents to a consumer upon request. The data and documents are identical to the requirements for debt buyers contained in the California Fair Debt Buying Practices Act which was adopted in 2013. [The author amended the bill to address several concerns raised by RMAI.]

Connecticut HB 6372 [Public Act No. 131] – This law exempts from execution certain funds in a judgment debtor’s bank account. Specifically, the amount of electronic direct deposits, not to exceed one thousand dollars, that are readily identifiable as wages, are exempt provided such deposits were made to the judgment debtor’s account during a look-back period of two months preceding the date that the execution was served on the financial institution. This law takes effect on October 1, 2021. [This bill was extensively negotiated by RMAI members and a sister trade association who engaged in grassroots advocacy efforts to make the new requirements more manageable for the industry. This is a great example of how grassroots advocacy efforts work.]

Maine HB 542 [Public Law 382] – The law makes adjustments to the value of property that is exempt from attachment and executions, including the homestead exemption; installment payment calculation related to judgments; personal property exemptions; and an inflation-indexed bank account exemption. This law takes effect on October 17, 2021. [Generally, the dollar threshold of exemptions in this law is consistent with other states. What stands out in this bill is the $3,000 bank account exemption which is tied to an inflation index which is on the higher side compared to recent enactments.]

Maine HB 1082 [Public Law 245] – The law contains several new requirements for debt collectors, including: (1) authorizing debt collectors to be licensed through the National Multistate Licensing System (NMLS); (2) new administrative procedures for the Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection relating to the issuing and revoking of collection licenses; (3) allowing debt collectors who have affiliates to have a single license and a single examination; (4) prohibiting debt collectors from collecting medical expenses from a consumer who has been determined to be qualified for free or charity care; and (5) prohibiting debt collectors from suing on debt in small claims courts. This law takes effect on October 17, 2021. [The bill was originally focused on debt buyers and contained more onerous documentation requirements. After extensive negotiations in 2020, RMAI was successful in removing most of the debt buying provisions from the bill with the remaining provisions applying universally to the collection industry and not singling out debt buyers. Additionally, RMAI was able to insert language which allows debt collectors who have affiliates to have a single license and a single examination.]

Minnesota HB 6a [Chapter # 4 of the First Special Session of 2021] – The law (appearing on pages 54-64) expands the definition of “collection agency” to include “debt buyers” which will thereby require debt buyers to be licensed as a collection agency under the existing Collection Agency Act. Debt buyer is defined as a “business engaged in the purchase of any charged-off account, bill, or other indebtedness for collection purposes, whether the business collects the account, bill, or other indebtedness, hires a third party for collection, or hires an attorney for litigation related to the collection.” Debt buyers are statutorily exempted from six provisions in the Collection Agency Act related to a third-party collection agency’s interaction with clients, including the maintaining of trust accounts. Debt buyers are required to be licensed as of January 1, 2022; however, any debt buyer whose application is filed prior to January 1, 2022 and is pending a decision, may continue to operate without a license until the commissioner approves or denies the application. A new provision is added to the Collection Agency Act which allows affiliated companies to operate under a single license and be subject to a single examination, provided that all the affiliated company names are listed on the license. [RMAI was successful in negotiating into the legislation the six statutory exemptions for debt buyers that related to client relationships; permitting affiliated companies to share a license; and allowing debt buyers to continue operations while their application is pending approval.]

New York SB 153 – This bill which is known as the “Consumer Credit Fairness Act” would: (1) reduce the statute of limitations from six to three years on consumer credit transactions; (2) prohibit the revival of a debt that is beyond the statute of limitations through the making of a payment; (3) require the mailing of a notice by the court clerk after filing proof of service of the summons and complaint; (4) require specific data to be included in the complaint; and (5) require the provision of form affidavits. [This bill has passed both houses of the State Legislature and the Governor is expected to sign the bill into law. RMAI had been actively opposing this bill since it was first introduced in 2009. After years of industry offers to negotiate the bill being rejected, the sponsors finally expressed a desire to discuss our concerns. After 13 months of negotiations, the industry was successful at: (1) removing language which would have expunged all debt at the expiration of the statute of limitations; (2) removing pre-charge-off itemization requirements on revolving lines of credit; (3) changing the point of reference on data and documents from origination to charge-off; (4) clarifying a provision of existing law, that some judges were misinterpreting, to make clear that creditors are not required to inform consumers when their accounts are sold in order for the successor parties in interest to be able to collect on those accounts; and (5) extending the effective date by six months to provide the industry time to adjust operational controls as well as accelerate any legal actions under existing law.]

U.S. Supreme Court Decision on Standing Substantially Restricts Ability to Sue for Statutory Violations

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, No. 20-297, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3401 (June 25, 2021)

On June 25, 2021, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a plaintiff must suffer a concrete injury resulting from a defendant’s statutory violation to have Article III standing to pursue damages from that defendant in federal court. The Court also held that plaintiffs in a class action must prove that every class member has standing for each claim asserted and for each form of relief sought.

The case began at a car dealership where the plaintiff sought to finance the purchase of a vehicle. When running a credit check, the dealership received a credit report indicating that the plaintiff’s name matched a name on a list of “specially designated nationals” maintained by the United States Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The list contains the names of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other serious criminals deemed to be a threat to national security. After seeing the plaintiff’s credit report, the dealership refused to sell him a car.

The following day, the plaintiff called credit reporting agency (CRA) to request a copy of his credit file pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). The CRA fulfilled the request and included a copy of the CFPB’s summary of rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2). The documents sent to the plaintiff omitted the OFAC alert, so the following day the CRA sent the plaintiff a second letter explaining that his name potentially matched a name on the OFAC list. However, the second letter did not include the CFPB’s summary of rights.

The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the CRA asserting three claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA): (1) that in utilizing the OFAC list, the CRA failed to follow reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of information in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); (2) that by omitting the OFAC information from the credit file initially mailed to plaintiff, the CRA failed to provide all the information in the credit file, in violation of § 1681g(a)(1); and (3) that by failing to include another copy of the summary of rights in the second mailing to plaintiff, the CRA violated § 1681(c)(2).

The plaintiff also asserted those three claims on behalf of a class of all people in the United States to whom the CRA mailed a follow-up OFAC notice without a summary of rights, i.e., those who received a mailing like the second mailing received by the plaintiff. There were 8,185 people in the class, but only 1,853 of them had their credit reports sent to creditors during the relevant time period.

The plaintiff prevailed on all three claims at trial and the jury awarded over $60 million ($984.22 in statutory damages and $6,353.08 in punitive damages for each member of the class). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that all members of the class had Article III standing, but the circuit court reduced the punitive damages award to just under $4,000 per class member, which brought the overall award to roughly $40 million. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court’s decision focused on whether each member of the class suffered a “concrete” injury and further developed its analysis of concreteness provided five years earlier in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016). In particular, the Court elaborated on the limits of Congress’s power to create statutory injuries that can form the basis of a lawsuit in federal court. After all, as the Court held in Spokeo, “Article III requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” And this means that “[o]nly those plaintiffs who have been concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation may sue that private defendant over that violation in federal court.”

In further describing those Congressional limits, the Court cited recent FDCPA decisions from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. The Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit (Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 999, n. 2 (11th Cir. 2020)) that Congress’s “say so” does not make an injury concrete. The Court also quoted the Seventh Circuit decision written by then-Judge (now Justice) Barrett in Casillas v. Madison Avenue Assocs., Inc., 926 F. 3d 329, 332 (7th 2019), to explain that “‘Article III grants federal courts the power to redress harms that defendants cause plaintiffs, not a freewheeling power to hold defendants accountable for legal infractions.’”

In determining whether the class members had standing, the Court examined whether the alleged injury bore a “close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts,” here the harm to one’s reputation resulting from defamation.

Starting with the 1,853 class members whose credit reports were disseminated to creditors, the Court noted that American law has long recognized that a person is injured when a defamatory statement is published to a third party. Therefore, class members whose credit reports were published to third parties were injured because those reports flagged them as potential terrorists.

Although the credit reports merely alerted users to a potential match on the OFAC list and did not falsely assert that any class member was a terrorist, the Court held that the harm associated with being described as a potential terrorist bears a sufficiently close relationship to being called a terrorist. Therefore, the Court affirmed the finding of standing on the § 1681e(b) claim for the plaintiff and the 1,853 members of the class whose credit reports were disseminated by the CRA.

The Court then turned to the 6,332 class members whose credit reports were not disseminated and questioned whether they suffered a concrete injury from the mere existence of an inaccurate credit file that was never published to a third party. The Court determined that publication is necessary for a concrete injury, comparing an unpublished credit report with a defamatory letter that is hidden in a desk drawer instead of mailed.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that all class members had standing because they were subjected to a material risk of future harm based on the potential later release of their credit reports. The Court’s prior decision in Spokeo noted that a risk of future harm can sometimes satisfy the concreteness requirement, so long as the risk is sufficiently imminent and substantial.

Here, the Court took the opportunity to explain that a plaintiff exposed to a risk of future harm may sometimes have standing to pursue injunctive relief to prevent that harm from occurring, but a mere exposure to risk is insufficient to confer standing to seek retrospective damages. Because their credit reports were never published, the Court reversed the finding of standing for the other 6,332 class members on the § 1681e(b) claim.

The Court then addressed whether the class members had standing to pursue what it called the “disclosure claim” (based on the omission of OFAC information from the credit file sent to class members pursuant to § 1681g(a)) and the “summary-of-rights claim” (based on the failure to send another summary of rights with the follow-up mailing that contained the OFAC information). The plaintiff argued that all class members suffered a concrete injury because they were deprived of their right to receive information in the format required by the FCRA, but the Court rejected this argument because there was no evidence that any class member suffered a harm that bore a close relationship with a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. Indeed, there was no evidence that anyone other than the plaintiff himself even opened the two mailings, much less that anyone acted or failed to act based on the information contained in those mailings.

Although Congress can elevate to legally cognizable the harm associated with the denial of information subject to public disclosure, the Court again cited Casillas and Trichell in pointing out that the FCRA, like the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, is not a public-disclosure law. The Court then turned to Trichell once more in noting the failure to identify any “downstream consequences” resulting from the defective disclosures: “An ‘asserted informational injury that causes no adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.’” Therefore, the Court held that none of the class members had standing to pursue damages for the “disclosure claim” or the “summary-of-rights claim.”

Of significance with respect to Hunstein v. Preferred Collection & Mgmt. Servs., 994 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2021), the plaintiff in Ramirez also argued that the CRA “published” the credit reports internally to its own employees and externally to letter vendors who mailed those reports to the class members in response to their requests. The Court disposed of this argument with a footnote explaining that the argument was forfeited because it was asserted for the first time on appeal. However, the Court also called the argument “unavailing” because American courts have not traditionally recognized intra-company disclosures or disclosures to print vendors as actionable publications supporting a defamation claim. The appellee in Hunstein has already cited Ramirez as supplemental authority.

Sixth Circuit Holds Chapter 13 Bankruptcy filed in ‘Bad Faith’ Must Be Dismissed upon Request of Debtor

Smith v. U.S. Bank N.A. (In re Smith), 999 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2021)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) requires a bankruptcy court to dismiss a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition upon a debtor’s request, even if the debtor filed his or her petition in bad faith.

In 2004, a debtor obtained a $528,500 loan to purchase a home.  About one year later, the debtor defaulted on the loan resulting in the mortgage holder scheduling the property’s foreclosure sale for Aug. 7, 2007.

To prevent the foreclosure sale from going forward, the debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy thereby triggering the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  The debtor dismissed his Chapter 13 case after the Aug. 7, 2007, foreclosure sale date passed.

In 2017, the mortgage holder again scheduled the property’s foreclosure sale, and the debtor once again filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition. After the property’s foreclosure sale date passed, the debtor dismissed his Chapter 13 petition.

In early 2019, the appellee bank purchased the loan and subsequently set the property’s foreclosure sale for February 19, 2019.  The day before the foreclosure sale, the debtor predictably filed a third Chapter 13 petition, again obtaining an automatic stay preventing the foreclosure sale from moving forward. The debtor dismissed his Chapter 13 petition six days later, which the bankruptcy court granted.

In June 2019, the bankruptcy court granted the bank’s motion to vacate the dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and separately lifted the automatic stay that would have prevented the property’s foreclosure sale.

The debtor appealed to the district court seeking a stay of the bankruptcy court’s reinstatement of his Chapter 13 petition.  The district court denied the debtor’s request for a stay but certified for interlocutory appeal “the question whether the reinstatement of [debtor’s Chapter 13 petition] was contrary to law.”

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit was tasked with determining “the legality of the bankruptcy court’s June 2019 order reinstating [debtor’s] Chapter 13 case.”   11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) (“Section 1307”) provides that “[o]n request of the debtor at any time, if the case has not been converted [from a case under Chapter 7, 11, or 12], the court shall dismiss a case under this chapter.”

In analyzing Section 1307, the Sixth Circuit noted that upon a debtor’s request for dismissal, “the court shall dismiss a Chapter 13 case.”

In response, the bank argued that dictum from Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365 (2007), allows a bankruptcy court to deny a debtor’s motion to dismiss a Chapter 13 case if the debtor filed his or her petition in bad faith.

However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the bank’s argument explaining that the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the Marrama dictum in Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014), explaining that “[a]t most, Marrama’s dictum suggests that in some circumstances a bankruptcy court may be authorized to dispense with futile procedural niceties in order to reach more expeditiously an end result required by the Code.” Finding that Section 1307 is “no mere procedural nicety,” the Sixth Circuit rejected the bank’s reliance on Marrama.

Next, the bank argued that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) allows the bankruptcy court to vacate its dismissal of the debtor’s Chapter 13 petition.  However, the Sixth Circuit disagreed stating that Section 1307 mandates a bankruptcy court dismiss a Chapter 13 case upon a debtor’s request and “[Section 1307’s] command would be meaningless if a bankruptcy court could then vacate its dismissal under [Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)].”

Thus, the Court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the bankruptcy court could reinstate the debtor’s Chapter 13 case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), reversed the district court’s order denying the debtor’s motion for a stay, and instructed the bankruptcy court that it must dismiss the Chapter 13 petition.

Second Circuit Requires Arbitration Clause to be Reasonably Conspicuous Under California Law

Soliman v. Subway Franchisee Advert. Fund Tr., Ltd., No. 20-946, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 16943 (2d Cir. June 8, 2021)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action lawsuit under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

In so ruling, the Second Circuit concluded that, under California law, the plaintiff was not bound by the arbitration provision at issue because the defendant did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice in a brochure that the plaintiff was agreeing to the terms on the defendant’s website.

The plaintiff entered the defendant’s business, a sandwich shop, and an employee showed the plaintiff an in-store, hard-copy advertisement, on which the defendant offered to send special offers to the plaintiff’s phone if she texted a keyword.

The plaintiff proceeded to send a text message using the keyword and the defendant began sending her, via text message, hyperlinks to electronic coupons. The plaintiff alleged in her lawsuit that she later requested by text that the defendant stop sending her messages, but her request was ignored.

The plaintiff filed a putative class action lawsuit alleging TCPA violations. The defendant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that a contract was formed because the in-store advertisement, from which the plaintiff got the keyword, included a reference to terms and conditions, including an arbitration requirement, located on the defendant’s website and provided the URL.

The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. First, it held that the arbitration clause was not “reasonably conspicuous” because “a reasonably prudent consumer would not have had inquiry notice of the arbitration clause on the defendant’s website.” Second, the court held that the plaintiff did not “unambiguously manifest” intent to be bound by the arbitration clause by sending a text.

Because the court determined that there was no agreement to arbitrate, it declined to consider the parties’ additional arguments about the scope of the arbitration agreement or whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and the defendant timely appealed.

On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed whether, under California Law, a consumer was bound to the terms and conditions contained on a company’s website, which were generally referenced on a print advertisement as “[t]erms and conditions” alongside the web address for the website containing the exact terms/conditions (including an arbitration provision), because that consumer viewed the advertisement on display in a store.

It was undisputed that the plaintiff never actually saw the terms and conditions on the website, including the arbitration clause therein. Nevertheless, the defendant argued that the advertisement put the plaintiff on reasonable notice of those terms such that she should be bound by them.

The Second Circuit noted that, under California law, the basis of a lawfully formed contract is “a manifestation of mutual assent.” Even where the offeree does not have actual notice of the contract terms, she or he will still be bound by such terms if a “reasonably prudent” person would be on inquiry notice of those terms and she unambiguously manifested assent to those terms. “A person is on inquiry notice of terms of use – and, by extension, the arbitration provision contained therein – were reasonably clear and conspicuous such that a reasonable person in [the plaintiff’s] shoes would have been on inquiry notice of them.”

The Second Circuit held that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the terms and conditions on the website would be clear and conspicuous to a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position because:

  • the defendant failed to provide evidence regarding the size of the advertisement at issue, or the print size contained within that advertisement;
  • the reference to “[t]erms and conditions” was buried in a paragraph that was printed in significantly smaller font relative to the other text on the advertisement, and the reference itself was surrounded by a substantial amount of unrelated information;
  • the advertisement only vaguely referenced “[t]erms and conditions,” and did not state that a consumer would be agreeing to those terms if she sent a text message to the defendant’s short code, nor did it otherwise direct the consumer to such terms;
  • access to the terms and conditions on the defendant’s website required the plaintiff to type in the URL text provided on the hardcopy print advertisement into an internet browser on her cell phone or some other device with internet browsing capabilities; and
  • once linked to the defendant’s website, the heading stated that it contained “terms of use for this website,” thus potentially suggesting to a reasonable person (searching for conditions of the promotional offer) that the website did not contain any terms or conditions beyond those relevant to the use of the website.

The combination of barriers led the Second Circuit to “conclude that the terms and conditions were not reasonably conspicuous under the totality of the circumstances and, thus, a reasonable consumer would not realize she was being bound to such terms and conditions by sending a text message to [the defendant] in order to begin receiving promotional offers.”

Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that under California law, the plaintiff was not bound by the arbitration clause contained in the terms and conditions at issue and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration.

Eleventh Circuit Holds Insurance Coverage for TCPA Class Settlement Barred by Policy’s ‘Invasion of Privacy’ Exclusion

Horn v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 998 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2021)

The plaintiffs were a class of consumers that sued a company for sending unsolicited text messages, asserting two causes of action under the TCPA. After the plaintiffs filed suit, the defendant company sought coverage for the claims under its insurance policy, but the insurer denied the request.

The insurance policy contained an exclusion that provided the insurer “shall not be liable . . . for Loss on account of any Claim made against [the company] . . . based upon, arising out of, or attributable to any actual or alleged . . . invasion of privacy.”

The company then settled the TCPA lawsuit. In exchange for the class plaintiffs’ promise not to enforce the judgment against the company, the company admitted to liability for monetary damages, settled the suit, and assigned all of its rights against the insurer to the plaintiffs.

When the plaintiffs attempted to enforce the judgment against the insurer, the trial court determined that the insurance policy did not cover the settled class claims because the TCPA causes of action were “[c]laims . . . arising out of . . . an invasion of privacy.” The class plaintiffs timely appealed.

On appeal, the class plaintiffs argued that the class action was not excluded from coverage by the invasion of privacy exclusion because: (1) the class action alleged harms other than invasion of privacy; (2) TCPA claims do not include an element of invasion of privacy; and (3) at the very least, the exclusion was ambiguous and should have been resolved in favor of coverage.

The Eleventh Circuit determined that under Florida law, it must read the insurance policy “as a whole, endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Additionally, the Court observed “that insurance coverage must be construed broadly and its exclusions narrowly.” Given that general rule, the Court held that ambiguities are to be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage, but “to allow for such a construction the provision must actually be ambiguous.”

To give the invasion of privacy exclusion its “full meaning and operative effect,” the Eleventh Circuit focused its analysis on the operative terms “claim,” “arising out of,” and “invasion of privacy.”

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the insurance policy itself clearly defined the term “claim” as “a civil proceeding against any Insured commenced by the service of a complaint or similar pleading.” In this instance, therefore, the Court held that the claim was the civil proceeding against the company commenced by the service of the class action complaint.

Accordingly, in the Court’s view, if any of the allegations of the complaint were excluded from coverage, the entire lawsuit was excluded, even if the complaint contained allegations that would otherwise be covered.

Second, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has interpreted the phrase “arising out of” broadly and held that it is “broader in meaning than the term ‘caused by’ and means ‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin in,’ ‘growing out of,’ ‘flowing from,’ ‘incident to’ or ‘having a connection with.’” Thus, the Court concluded that Florida’s broad interpretation of the phrase “arising out of” meant that if the class action even “had a connection with” the invasion of privacy, the lawsuit fell under the invasion of privacy exclusion.

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the class action arose out of an “invasion of privacy” because the class complaint specifically alleged that the company intentionally invaded the class members’ privacy and sought recovery for those invasions.

Accordingly, because the invasion of privacy exclusion barred coverage for the class action, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer.

Silent Auction is Open!

For this Summer, RMAI’s Executive Summit Virtual Silent Auction is officially open and will come to an end at the Executive Summit on Tuesday, August 3rd. You can bid now on amazing items and help support RMAI’s Legislative Fund. The silent auction is open to all – you can even invite your friends, family and colleagues to participate.

If you are not registered to bid yet, please view our Silent Auction webpage.

We will continue to accept donated items for auction while the silent auction is open, so check back for new items.

Donate an item or donate to the Legislative Fund directly by donating online or sending a completed contribution form via email or by mail.

For suggested donation items, feel free to take a look at the Amazon Wishlist.

Executive Summit Live Experience Auction

In addition to the silent auction, RMAI will also host a live auction of custom experiences at the Executive Summit in Stowe, VT for attendees to bid on. Proceeds from this auction will also help support RMAI’s Legislative Fund.

About the Legislative Fund

RMAI actively monitors and responds to state and federal measures affecting how our members do business. Your contributions to the Legislative Fund extend the reach of RMAI’s advocacy across the country where and when needed. Read more about the Legislative Fund here.

CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS FOR THE 2022 ANNUAL CONFERENCE

THREE WEEKS LEFT TO SUBMIT A PROPOSAL!

RMAI is calling on our members to submit proposals for the 25th Annual Conference held at the Aria Resort & Casino in Las Vegas, February 7-10, 2022. We are seeking proposals for 50-minute educational sessions sharing your expertise and experience while addressing important issues, relevant industry information and best practices. View the requirements for submission and then submit your proposal here. Deadline to submit proposals is Monday, August 9, 2021.

WATCH WEBINARS

Register for RMAI’s next monthly webinar on August 25th, The Contemporary Collector, focusing on how your company can leverage technology for the future. View our Live Webinar page on the RMAI website for future webinars.

View our Online Education selection and register for previously recorded webinars including the most recent webinar hosted on July 14th, Now That You Know, You Can’t Unknow…What’s Next? All recorded monthly webinars are FREE to RMAI members. (Special series and select required courses for certification are offered at a discounted member rate.)

SPONSOR WEBINARS

Get your business name and logo in front of a captive audience of your colleagues and RMAI members when you sponsor a webinar! View our Webinar Sponsorship Flyer for details and benefits of a sponsorship.

Contact Shannon Parod at sparod@rmaintl.org or 916.482.2590 with any questions.

Remember to take advantage of the free recorded webinar benefit that all individuals from your company receive and earn RMAI’s Certified Receivables Compliance Professional (CRCP) designation.

If you are already setting time aside time for our monthly live webinars, why not apply those credits to becoming a Certified Receivables Compliance Professional (CRCP)?

You receive a certificate of completion for each recorded and live webinar you complete.

By earning and renewing your CRCP designation every two (2) years, you will always stay current on the most recent changes and trends in the industry, new compliance standards, regulations, and more.

Here are the educational requirements to complete your CRCP:

The following three (3) courses are required for CRCP initial certification and, for your convenience, can be purchased with our Certification Bundle for $275.00. The three (3) courses are:

  • Introductory Survey Course on Receivables Management (4 credits, required)
  • Ethics as the Cornerstone of a Compliance Management System (2 credits, required)
  • Diversity, Inclusion and Elimination of Bias: Reimagining the Post Pandemic Workplace (1 credit, required)

You can take your remaining seventeen (17) credits from our recorded webinars and live webinars found on the online Education section of the RMAI website (many FREE with Membership)! Due to COVID-19, RMAI is temporarily waiving the in-person credit requirements through December 31, 2021.

For more information regarding Certification and links to our directories of certified individuals and businesses, click here or contact Certification & Administration Coordinator, Lucia Romo at lromo@rmaintl.org.

Congratulations to our new and renewed Certified Receivables Compliance Professionals (CRCP) and new and renewed Certified Receivable Businesses (CRB)!

CRCP – New
Colene McNinch, M & G Solutions
Nichol Brehmer, Stenger & Stenger PC
Ross Kanan, Superlative RM
Staci Evans, Accelerated Portfolio, Inc.
Steve London, Velo Law Office

CRCP – Renewals
Andrew Carlson, Garnet Capital Advisors
Donna Boyd, First Financial Asset Management, Inc.
David Maczka, Diverse Funding / DNF Associates
Garon Robinett, Paradigm Assets, LLC
Jennifer Wilson, EverChain LLC d/b/a/ DebtTrader
Jon Mazzoli, Resurgent Capital Services
John Myers, Caine & Weiner
Kelly Knepper, Stephens – TrueAccord Corporation
Michael Johnson, Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC
Trace Dillon, Gulf Coast Collection Bureau, Inc
Karl Ryan, Interim Capital Group, Inc.
Ryan Hunt, Barclays

CRB – New
Debt Solutions LLC
Standard Equity Group

CRB – Renewals
Dyck O’Neal, Inc.
eCAST Settlement Corporation
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC
Klima, Peters & Daly, P.A.
NDS, LLC
Resurgence Capital, LLC
Second Round Limited Partnership
Interim Capital Group, Inc

View all certified businesses and vendors.
View all certified individuals.

For questions about certification, contact Certification & Administrative Coordinator, Lucia Romo at (916) 482-2462 or lromo@rmaintl.org.

Welcome New RMAI Members!

BDS Sales and Marketing, Inc. | NY
Camoli Investments, LLC | LA
Credit RP, LLC. | TX
First National Collection Bureau | NV
Lakeside Recovery Solutions, Inc. | NY
SMS Financial, LLC | AZ
Zenarate, Inc. | CA

2021 Atlanta Regional Event | September 27-28, 2021, | Atlanta, GA
Take advantage of the member rate and REGISTER for the upcoming 2021 Atlanta Regional Event! The event will be packed with opportunities to network with your colleagues, learn about current State and Federal Advocacy, Golf and watch a Baseball game at Truist Park!  CLICK HERE for more information about the event.

Interested in Sponsorship? Contact Kristy Schrimsher at kschrimsher@rmaintl.org.

RMAI’s leadership cultivates relationships within the receivables management industry to expand business opportunities for members.

2021 ACA International Convention | July 28-30, 2021

RMAI Executive Summit 2021 | August 2-4, 2021

RMAI 2021 Atlanta Regional Event | September 27-28, 2021

2022 Annual Conference | February 7-10, 2022

Contribute Now

Thank you to our July 2020 – July 9, 2021 Legislative Fund Contributors!

Diamond $25,000
Cavalry Investments, LLC
Crown Asset Management, LLC
Financial Recovery Services, Inc.
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC
Resurgent Holdings, LLC

Titanium $15,000
Velocity Portfolio Group, Inc.

Platinum $10,000
C&E Acquisition Group, LLC/Diverse Funding Associates, LLC/DNF Associates
CKS Financial
Crown Asset Management, LLC
Encore Capital Group, Inc.
Unifund CCR LLC

Gold $7,500
First Financial Portfolio Service, LLC

Silver $5,000
Collins Asset Group LLC
NCB Management Services, Inc.
Oliphant United, LLC
Pharus Funding, LLC
Superlative RM
The Bureaus, Inc.
U.S. Equities Corp.

Bronze $2,500
Absolute Resolutions Corp.
Central Portfolio Control, Inc.
Investment Retrievers, Inc.
National Loan Exchange, Inc.
RAzOR Capital, LLC
SAM, Inc. – Solutions for Account Management
Security Credit Services, LLC
Spire Recovery Solutions, LLC
Synergetic Communication, inc.
Tobin & Marohn

Brass $1,000
Andreu, Palma, Lavin & Solis, PLLC
Balbec Capital, LP
Ballard Spahr LLP
Bayview Solutions, LLC
Butler & Associates, P.A.
Capio
Digital Recognition Network
Equifax, Inc.
Halsted Financial Services, LLC
Investinet, LLC
Jefferson Capital Systems, LLC
Jormandy, LLC
Kino Financial Co., LLC
Plaza Services, LLC
Pressler, Felt and Warshaw, LLP
Resurgence Capital, LLC
Stenger & Stenger P.C.
Stephen L. Bruce & Associates
The Cadle Company
The Law Offices of Ronald S. Canter, LLC
TrueAccord
United Holding Group
Verifacts, Inc.
Vertican Technologies, Inc

Other
Accelerated Data Systems
Acctorp International, Inc.
Action Collection Agencies, Inc.
Aldridge Pite Haan, LLP
Alliance Credit Services, Inc.
Alpha Recovery Corp.
Applied Innovation, Inc.
Arko Consulting LLC
ARM Compliance Business Solutions, LLC
ATKB Portfolio Management
Attunely Inc.
Ballard Spahr, LLP
Bloom & Associates, P.A.
Capital Collection Management, LLC
Cascade Capital, LLC
Central Research, Inc.
CMS Services
Collins Asset Group
Commercial Credit Group Inc.
Complete Credit Solutions
Comtronic Systems, LLC
Convergence Acquisitions, LLC
Converging Capital, LLC
Convoke, Inc.
Credit Control, LLC
Credit Management Corporation
CSS Impact!
D & A Services, LLC
D. Scott Carruthers, APLC
David Reid
DebtTrader
Delev & Associates, LLC
Delta Outsource Group, Inc.
Dynamic Recovery Solutions
Faloni Law Group, LLC
FLOCK Specialty Finance
FMS, Inc.
FocusOne, Inc.
Full Circle Financial Services, LLC
G. Reynolds Sims & Associates, P.C.
Gaskell & Giovannini, LLC
Genesis Recovery Services
Glass Mountain Capital, LLC
Harvest Strategy Group, Inc.
Hunt & Henriques
Indiana Receivables, Inc.
International Debt Buying Consultants, LLC
Invenio Financial, a Phillips & Cohen Associates Company
Jan Stieger
Keith D. Weiner & Associates Co., LPA
Kelly Knepper- Stephens
Kirschenbaum & Phillips, P.C.
Law Office of James R. Vaughan, P.C.
Law Offices of Daniel C. Consuegra, P.L.
Law Offices of Steven Cohen, LLC
Lippman Recupero
Lockhart, Morris & Montgomery, Inc.
Logicoll, LLC
London & London
LTD Financial Services
Malone Frost Martin PLLC
Maurice Wutscher LLP
Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC
Metronome Financial LLC
Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.
MRS BPO, LLC
Mullooly, Jeffrey, Rooney & Flynn, LP
National Check Resolution, Inc.
National Enterprise Systems, Inc.
National Recovery Associates
National Recovery Solutions
NDS, LLC
Nelson & Kennard
Neustar, Inc.
NRA Group, LLC
Ontario Systems, LLC
Orion Capital Solutions, LLC
Palinode, LLC
PCI Group, Inc.
PerSolve, LLC
Phin Solutions, Inc.
Portnoy Schneck, L.L.C.
Poser Investments, Inc.
Premier Forty Financial, LLC
ProVest
Quantum3 Group, LLC
Resource Management Services, Inc
RevSpring
RIP Medical Debt
Robinson Hoover & Fudge, PLLC
SCORE Statistical Consulting
Simmonds & Narita LLP
Slovin & Associates
Solutions by Text
Sonnek & Goldblatt, Ltd.
Stone, Higgs & Drexler
Superlative RM
Troy Capital, LLC
Universal Fidelity LP
US Mortgage Resolution, LLC
USI Solutions, Inc.
VanDerHeyden Law Office PA
Vargo & Janson, P.C.
Venable LLP
Venandi Systems, LLC
Viking Client Services, Inc.
VoApps
Wipfli LLP